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ABSTRACT
This study focused upon assessing various relationships between 
the presence or absence of a transitional object in early childhood 
and aspects of psychological functioning in later life. The nature of 
the inanimate object attachments were determined by stringent criteria 
involving both self- and parental-reports. Personality differences 
were found between those subjects demonstrating strong singular 
attachments that persisted for a considerable period of time and 
those having no such significant attachments. The nature of what 
might be considered optimal object attachments was discussed in 





The recognition by parents of the importance of special objects 
in the lives of their children has been commonly acknowledged. Recently 
it has become an area of psychological scrutiny. Winnicott (1953) was 
the first to express the importance of these blankets, teddy bears, and 
other cuddly toys and objects in the normal development of the child.
The nature of Winnicott's concept of transitional objects and transi­
tional phenomena has yielded a new and fascinating perspective of the 
psychological growth of the very young child. From its inception it 
was readily supported and adopted, though it has not been without its 
critics. It has been related to a diverse spectrum of developmental 
issues ranging from the earliest symbolic capacities of the infant and 
various aspects of the separation-individuation process to the level of 
an individual's object relations. To thoroughly grasp the magnitude of 
Winnicott's contribution it is necessary to view this concept from a 
broad perspective.
The theoretical framework upon which the concepts of transitional 
objects and transitional phenomena are based stems from classical psycho­
analytic theory and the more recent developments in object relations 
theory. The specific terminology used by these schools of thought to
1
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describe these dynamic formulations is necessary in order to provide an 
adequate understanding of the concepts. Without remaining within this 
framework much of the meaning of the transitional object is lost.
In this review of the concept of the transitional object, empha­
sis is placed upon: Winnicott's original thinking and its elaboration 
over the years; the distinction between normal and pathological usage of 
an object; the extention of Winnicott's concepts by other theoreticians; 
the relationship to everyday creativity; applications to clinical prob­
lems and issues; as well as some empirical investigations that have 
attempted to objectively assess dimensions of this area.
Winnicott's Contribution
Winnicott's formulations of the transitional object serve as the 
basic framework by which other investigators and theoreticians view this 
phenomena. Winnicott (1953) considered the use of the transitional 
object to be a developmental progression from the infant's initial oral 
activities. He suggested that, "there is a wide variation to be found 
in a sequence of events which starts with the newborn infant's fist-in­
mouth activities, and that leads eventually on to an attachment to a 
teddy, a doll or a soft toy, or hard toy" (p. 89). Winnicott recog­
nized their supportive nature in helping children deal with the emo­
tionally arousing aspects or separation from the mother. This "separ­
ation anxiety" Winnicott believes can be dealt with by the creation of 
a symbolic representation of the mother in the form of a special object. 
But more importantly though is the role of the transitional object as a 
crucial element in the development away from total dependence on the 
mother to the child's growing independence. This area of experience
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or "transitional period" marks an important aspect of life for the 
child. Winnicott
. . . introduced the terms "transitional object" and "transi­
tional phenomena" for the designation of the intermediate 
area of experience, between thumb and teddy bear, between 
the oral eroticism and true object relationship, between 
primary unawareness of indebtedness and the acknowledgment 
of indebtedness ("Say: ta!") (p. 89).
The relationship between these early oral activities and the 
later development of a transitional object is extremely important in 
Winnicott's conceptualization, as it recognizes a shift from one mode 
of experience to another. It is the role of the transitional object 
as the "first not-me possession" which marks the growing distinction 
and differentiation between inner reality (i.e., archaic thinking of 
the primary process) and outer reality (i.e., secondary process think­
ing involving rational object-directed activity). It is during this 
period that the child is moving from a "subjective" inner world of 
experience to the external "objective" world of experience. The 
transitional period bridges this maturational process of experiential 
functioning. It should be noted that Winnicott's formulation goes 
one step further than merely indicating a primary mode of dealing 
with inner and outer reality. Inherent in his concepts of transi­
tional objects and transitional phenomena is the location of what he 
refers to as "transitional space." This area of experience is the 
"third part of life" of the individual. It
. . . is an intermediate area of experiencing to which inner 
reality and external life both contribute. It is an area 
which is not challenged, because no claim is made on its 
behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the 
individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping 
inner and outer reality separate yet inter-related (p. 90).
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A critical aspect in understanding the transitional object is 
the necessity to focus upon the role of "illusion" as it relates upon 
the infant's early instinctual needs which must subsequently give way 
to reality and its acceptance. The infant initially is extremely 
dependent upon the mother figure who must meet its every need. It is 
the nature of this early mother-infant interaction that serves as the 
basis for the development of good illusion. If the mother's care and 
devotion provide adequately for the infant's needs then an optimal 
situation exists.
The good-enough "mother" (not necessarily the infant's own 
mother) is one who makes active adaptation to the infant's 
needs, an active adaptation that gradually lessens, accord­
ing to the infant's growing ability to account for failure 
of adaptation and to tolerate the results of frustration 
(p. 94).
It is of upmost importance that the mother's adaptations in the begin­
ning are near perfect. This provides the infant with the sense of 
"magical control" and the experience of "omnipotence" over the breast. 
This creates the illusion that the breast is actually part of the 
infant. The illusion of fusion with the breast and the concommitant 
experience of omnipotent control over it provides the basic capacity 
needed to transcend the space between subjective experience and exter­
nal reality. Winnicott expresses the relationship of the healthy use 
of illusion as.
the mother's adaptation to the infant's needs, when good 
enough, gives the infant the illusion that there is an 
external reality that corresponds to the infant's own 
capacity to create. In other words, there is an overlap 
between what the mother supplies and what the infant might 
conceive of. . . . The infant perceives the breast only in 
so far as a breast could be created just there and then 
Cp. 95).
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As the infant matures there is greater need to adhere to the reality 
principle (i.e., awareness of the demands of the environment). The 
onset of such change in experience creates a sense of "disillusion­
ment." This is essentially a shift in what is "subjectively con­
ceived" to what is "objectively perceived." Transitional object 
formation appears to be the manner in which the struggle between 
inner and outer reality is dealt with. It is the transitional 
object that fills the area of experience once occupied by primary 
illusion. As Winnicott states,
The intermediate area to which I am referring is the area 
that is allowed to the infant between primary creativity 
and objective perception based on reality testing. The 
transitional phenomena represent the early stages of the 
use of illusion, without which there is no meaning for the 
human being in the idea of a relationship with an object 
that is perceived by others as external to that being (p. 95).
The transitional object thus provides the infant with an "unchallenged" 
area of experience yet different than the experience of magical control 
over the breast. Winnicott emphasizes this distinction as, "the transi­
tional object is not an internal object (which is a mental concept)—  
it is a possession. Yet it is not (for the infant) an external object 
either" (p. 94).
This relates directly to the transitional objects existence as 
a third area of experience, part "inner reality" and part "outer- 
reality," part "me" and part "not-me." Its distinction from an inter­
nal (i.e., introjected) object is an important aspect, though its con­
nection to the internal object is essential as well. Winnicott states 
the nature of this relationship in the following:
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The infant can employ a transitional object when the internal 
object is alive and real and good enough (not too persecutory).
But this internal object depends for its qualities on the 
existence and aliveness and behavior of the external object 
(breast, mother figure, general environmental care). Badness 
of failure of the latter indirectly leads to deadness or to a 
persecutory quality of internal object. After a persistence 
of failure of the external object, the internal object fails 
to have meaning to the infant, and then, and then only, does 
the transitional object become meaningless too. The transi­
tional object may therefore stand for the "external" breast, 
but indirectly, through standing for an "internal" breast 
(p. 94).
The magnitude of Winnicott's formulations of transitional phe­
nomena and transitional object extend beyond these aforementioned 
aspects of early development. The nature of transitional phenomena 
throughout the life of the individual has been given special atten­
tion by Winnicott. Winnicott in essence helped place these phenomena 
of early childhood in a theoretical framework which provides a greater 
understanding of a broad range of human experience. As Winnicott 
states of the transitional object,
Its fate is to be gradually allowed to be decathected, so 
that in the course of years it becomes not so much forgot­
ten as relegated to limbo. By this I mean that in health 
the transitional object does not "go inside," nor does the 
feeling about it necessarily undergo repression. It is not 
forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning and this 
is because the transitional phenomena have become diffused, 
have become spread out over the whole intermediate territory 
between "inner psychic reality" and "the external world as 
perceived by two persons in common," that is to say, over 
the whole cultural field.
The extension of these phenomena, Winnicott further states,
widens out into play, and of artistic creativity and appre­
ciation, and of religious feeling, and of dreaming, and also 
fetishism, lying and stealing, the origin and loss of affec­
tionate feeling, drug addiction, the talisman of obsessional 
rituals, etc. (p. 91).
The developmental progression from the use of the transitional 
object is into the area of play. The child in play is, as in the
7
transitional period, engaged in an area of experience between inner and 
outer reality. This theoretical conception of Winnicott's (1971) is 
uniquely distinct in contrast to traditional psychoanalytic formulations 
of play. In more classical terms play was considered a manifestation of 
sublimated instinctual drives (i.e., masturbatory activities). Winnicott 
rather directed attention to play as existing in a neutral area of inter­
mediate experience or what he terms "potential space." This space grows 
out of the early mother-infant interaction where a sense of magical or 
omnipotent control originates which is founded upon the "good-enough 
mothering" experience. It is within this early interaction that play 
originates. This is not to say instincts are not involved but rather 
are secondary to something more important. When they do become pro­
nounced Winnicott feels play is interfered with. The instincts, states 
Winnicott, "are the main threat to play as to the ego" (p. 52). Play 
for the child is "satisfying" as were the early experiences with the 
mother. It evolves out of trust. This capacity develops through the 
good-enough mothering experiences and the knowledge that the loved per­
son is reliable and consistent in the meeting of needs. Winnicott refers 
to these good early experiences as crucial in the development of "ego- 
relatedness." It is the culmination of these experiences that provide 
the child with the ability to play. It is the "preoccupation" of the 
child engaged in play that amply demonstrates the intermediate area of 
experience. As Winnicott states: "The content does not matter. What 
matters is the near withdrawal state, akin to concentration of older 
children and adults. The playing child inhabits an area that cannot 
be easily left, nor can it easily admit intruders" (1971, p. 51).
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One further elaboration of this theme of the developmental 
progression from the transitional object into the area of play will 
be useful. As has been mentioned earlier the creation of transitional 
objects is founded upon the good-enough environmental experiences with 
the concommitant illusion of omnipotent or magical control, which sub­
sequently gives way to reality adaptations, differentiation, and the 
progression from subjective to objective experience. Inherent in the 
early mother-infant interaction is the experience of total dependence 
by the infant. It is within this realm, when good-enough, that the 
infant experiences what Winnicott refers to as a sense of "being."
This sense of being is essentially derived through the illusion of 
fusion with the breast-object. It is here that the infant and the 
mother not only "feel at one" but "are one." This early sense of 
being is the foundation upon which one's later psychological cohe­
siveness (i.e., identity) is formed. For without this experience the 
gratifications of life remain allusive, as does the sense of feeling 
whole and connected with the world. With this initial experience the 
later capacity for "doing" can be established. This sense of doing 
reflects the ability to function and experience the world in a more 
mature fashion. This initiates a sense of object relating in the 
area of objective experience, where one feels "real" and in tune with 
reality. These capacities of being and doing relate to the concept 
of creativity as used by Winnicott. This is not the creativity judged 
by product but rather a "universal" process. As Winnicott states, "It 
belongs to being alive . .*. the approach of the individual to external 
reality" (pp. 67-68). It is the nature of this creative capacity in
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which transitional phenomena are formed, where the area of subjective 
and objective reality meet and where life is experienced. This poten­
tial space develops: first from the earliest subjective experiences; 
to those founded in illusion; then into the transitional realm and the 
use of transitional objects; into the area of play; later to the expe­
rience of play with another individual; and finally into the cultural 
experience in general.
The Fetish and Transitional Object
The use of inanimate objects from early infancy through adult­
hood has initiated much controversy and confusion as to the actual 
genesis and function of these objects. Their formation and develop­
ment in infancy and use through childhood has been considered normal 
and healthy by some investigators, while others view such inanimate 
object attachments to be signs of present as well as possible future 
psychopathology in adulthood in the form of the fetish object. This 
section will attempt to evaluate the development of psychological 
thought in this area with special emphasis upon differentiating the 
features between the fetish, which applies to a narrow area of adult 
perversion, predominantly in males, and the transitional object.
Aspects of the Adult 
and Infantile Fetish
Although the fetish has been traditionally considered as an 
aspect of adult psychopathology, it has been gaining greater atten­
tion, within what is believed to be its precursor manifestations, 
namely the infantile and childhood fetish. Within the classical 
framework of adult fetishism, the fetish was believed to develop
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during the oedipal period at the height of castration (i.e., fear of 
bodily destruction) anxiety. Some individuals have dealt with this 
overwhelming panic by the creation of a symbolic maternal phallus 
(i.e., unharmed powerful body part) in the form of a concrete object 
as a defensive means of protecting themselves from this threat.
Freud (1927, 1959) has suggested that the actual sight of the penis­
less mother is a necessary component of severe castration panic which 
leads to the development of the fetish. Wulff's (1946) consideration 
of inanimate object attachments by the infant as fetishistic posed a 
challenge to the previously accepted notions of the origins of the 
adult fetish. Wulff's dealings with individuals with infantile pre- 
oedipal fetishes suggests that rather than the fetish representing a 
maternal phallus it may be a symbolic representation of the breast. 
Otherwise, it would have been necessary for the oral infant to have 
observed the lack of a maternal penis and not only have had experi­
enced a castration threat, but would have had to repress the threat 
in the process of creating a symbolic maternal phallus. Wulff's new 
position of the inanimate or fetish object as being a substitute 
object for the breast distinguishes infantile fetishes from adult 
fetishes. As Wulff states, "fetishistic manifestations in the young 
child are not at all uncommon, but the psychological structure of 
childhood fetishism, as of other psychological manifestations, is a 
different one" (p. 465). The nature of the childhood fetish there­
fore, is of an oral instinctual type which may be due to vicisitudes 
in weaning. Wulff also relegates tactile and olfactory aspects to 
the fetish object which may represent predominance of more "activistic"
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qualities of the nature of early experience and which become associated 
to the substitute or fetish object of primary identification.
Views of Inanimate Object Usage 
by Children as Fetishistic
Sperling (1963) a harsh critique of Winnicott's concept of 
transitional objects, clearly states that, "Winnicott's concepts are 
not only fallacious but dangerous because they lead to erroneous 
assessment of the meaning and function of fetishistic childhood phe­
nomena and childhood fetishism" (p. 377). Sperling postulates sev­
eral factors that contribute to the pathological nature of these early 
object attachments, based upon her own clinical experience with appar­
ent childhood fetish behavior. Like Wulff, Sperling accepts the oral 
nature of these attachments as the underpinnings of fetishistic mani­
festations. Such children displaying the fetish object reflect a 
symbolic part-object (i.e., not fully differentiated as separate from 
the self) breast attachment. It is the later developmental maturation 
of the child which exposes and superimposes anal and phallic attributes 
upon the object. The mother is believed to be a key figure in the for­
mation of these childhood fetishes. Sperling's analytic work appears 
to suggest that it is often the mother's own unconscious motives and 
conflicts that are being imposed on the child. In this manner not 
only is the mother responsible for the unconscious stimulation and 
encouragement of such behavior, but is often instrumental in the 
actual choice of the object (i.e., offering a substitute object in 
lieu of herself). Sperling states:
that the need for a fetish has something to do with the real­
ity of the child's experiences. In the lives of these children 
there has been real seduction and actual overstimulation of
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component instincts in the relationship with the parents, 
especially with the mother (p. 381).
The development of the fetish is thus an external adaptation to the dis­
torted instinctual drives. In this manner frustrated instinctual drives 
are placed onto the object and away from the frustrating mother and self 
The fetishist's true detriment is in the disturbances in the internaliza 
tion process inherent in normal superego development. As Sperling 
states, "There is incomplete introjection of parental images because of 
persistance of part-object relationship and deflection of unmodified 
sexual and aggressive impulses to the fetish" (pp. 381-382). Sperling 
apparently considers the fetish object a sign of disturbed object rela­
tionships. It develops through disturbances in early mother-infant 
interaction where a fixation appears to occur to a part object (i.e., 
breast) in the form of a fetish object. The development of the fetish 
is suggested to be a result of a threat to the self founded upon an 
apparent loss of magical or omnipotent control over the breast or part 
object. At this stage of development, which is at the height of pri­
mary narcissism, loss of object is analagous to loss of self. Such a 
loss is in turn defended against by the creation of the fetish.
This narcissitic investment in an inanimate object may bear 
some semblance to Kohut's (1971) theorizing of narcissistic personal­
ity disorders. Such individuals according to Kohut are fixated at a 
primary state in which part object relations of an idealized nature 
are evident, with the concommitant interference of normal superego 
integration, very similar to Sperling's assertations. The difference 
in the development of the fetish in contrast to the developmental fix­
ation of the narcissistic individual, when both are confronted with
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loss of object and thus loss of self, is in the defensive manuever to 
adapt to the strain. The individual creating the fetish has made an 
external, more realistic adaptation, while the narcissistic individual 
or neurotic individual as Sperling suggests, makes a more internal 
adaptation expressed in "fantasy or symptoms." Sperling's position 
is clearly one that views the inanimate object attachments of the 
infant and those inanimate attachments of the adult as existing on a 
developmental continuum. As she states, "The child's fetish and the 
fetish of the adult appear to be different stages of the same process, 
which may or may not lead to adult fetishism" (p. 391).
Dickes (1963) is also skeptical of Winnicott's assertions that 
attachments to inanimate objects by the young child are healthy. He 
also tends to feel that these object attachments are of a fetishistic 
nature. Clearly he asserts that they represent the part-object of the 
parents which is often of an anatomically sexual nature. In the devel­
opment of such fetishistic objects, Dickes believes that preoedipal 
experiences (i.e., oral and anal) are involved. He finds such mate­
rial to be often related to later castration anxiety and the manifes­
tation of the fetish object in adult life. Dickes believes the dis­
tinctions made between the infantile fetish, transitional object, and 
adult fetish to be "artificial." Although the complex of experience 
that leads to the adult fetish is intricate, there are certain factors 
that seem to be outstanding. Much like Sperling's assumptions, Dickes 
finds the role of the parents to be instrumental, often in their exhi- 
bitionistic and seductive behavior allowing such children ample oppor­
tunity to view the anatomical features of their bodies, in their
14
unconscious rejections and neurotic projections on to the child, as well
as in encouraging the use of inanimate objects in lieu of themselves.
The amalgamation of this overall process is summarized by Dickes:
The final fetish may be said to have a composite of meanings 
covering the various developmental phases. The fetish even­
tually comes to signify the parents as partial objects, that 
is, the parents reduced to their sexual parts. This concept 
is to be considered as amending Freud's remarks concerning 
the fetish as representative of the female phallus. The role 
of the parents in the production of fetishism cannot be over­
looked. Exhibitionism and other sexual exploitations of the 
child are commonplace. The parents are themselves often the 
investigators of the fetish choice which serves the purpose 
of circumventing the urgency and power of the drive interplay 
between parent and child. The introduction and use of inani­
mate objects can, under special circumstances, be harmful and 
lead to the development of full-fledged fetishism (pp. 328-329).
Buxbaum's (1960) work with two young girls whose apparent hair 
pulling behavior, she believed, suggests close relationship to Winni- 
cott's conceptualization of transitional objects. Evidently both girls 
had preoedipal experiences of seeing the parents' genital areas. The 
trauma was compounded by one girl's experience of her mother's menstrual 
bleeding while the other observed a genital injury to her father. Bux- 
baum marks the critical age for both these girls' experiences at eigh­
teen months. The important factor again was exhibitionistic behavior 
by the parents of an often suggestive and seductive kind. Although 
neither child had a fetish object, they readily adopted them when they 
were presented to them, in one case it was a stuffed poodle offered by 
the therapist, in the other a woolly kitten by the mother. Both objects 
were engaged in a fetishistic manner, the letter of which was employed 
repeatedly in masturbatory activity. Through the process of uncovering 
the underlying traumatic material, Buxbaum was able to eliminate the 
hair pulling, which was an apparent identification with the genital
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areas of the parents and inability to separate from the primary object. 
This behavior was interpreted as an attempt by the children "to fulfill 
their need for tactile and skin sensations" (p. 259). Subsequently, 
the children were able to use their "intermediary" inanimate objects 
to promote healthier object relationships and facilitate separation 
from the previously fixated part-object mother.
The work of Greenacre (1953, 1955, 1960, 1968) provides some of 
the more definitive considerations of the etiology of adult fetishism 
in light of early developmental experiences. Her late work (1969, 1970) 
also provides some very useful insights into the similarities and differ­
ences between the fetish object and transitional object.
It appears from Greenacre's clinical experience with adult fet­
ishists that certain elements appear common as probable genetic (i.e., 
related to psychological development) factors. Initially Greenacre 
(1953) speculated that early mother-infant disturbances due to not good- 
enough mothering may create a flaw in the normal development of the 
infant's developing body image. This poorly developed sense of body 
image formation may create a tendency or predisposition by the individ­
ual for an overreaction in the oedipal-phallic period of exaggerated 
castration anxiety. Since such an individual is weakened in the realm 
of body image formation the later castration anxiety is dealt with by 
the creation of the fetish object to defend against this overwhelming 
threat to self, and especially, threat to the genitals. Thus, the 
fetish is a means of supporting a weak genital body outline formation. 
This is not to suggest that early disturbances in infancy will lead to 
later fetish formation, but rather disturbances both in early infancy
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and in the phallic stage may interact for the possible likelihood of 
emergence. Greenacre's (1969) later conceptualizations placed empha­
sis on two other factors which seem to promote the fetish creation.
These include consistent and ample opportunity of exposure to the ana­
tomical differences between the sexes, and the experience of viewing 
damage or injury to an important other (i.e., parent, or the infant 
himself). These visual experiences at critical times, during the sec­
ond and fourth years, may cause disturbances in the formation of a 
sound body image, particularly if the mothering experiences have been 
inadequate. It seems that the visual experience of these events with 
the concommitant tactile nature of the body-image formation process 
contribute to the external concrete nature of the fetish object. In 
a later attempt to reconcile the theoretical problems inherent in 
relating early infantile disturbances with later oedipal castration 
anxiety, Greenacre (1970) states the following:
It is my impression that early fetish formation does not 
develop unless the accompanying disturbances have been so 
undermining as to produce a severe preoedipal castration 
problem, whether through illness, operative procedure, or 
severe parental mishandling. It is significant that at 
the early age of one to two years there is a general body 
responsiveness to discomfort of physical insult, and dis­
charge of tension may occur through whatever channels are 
available at this special time. If the disturbance is so 
severe however, that ordinary discharge mechanisms are 
inadequate, premature genital stimulation may be induced.
This is most likely to occur during the second year. This 
tends then to promote sadomasochistic elements in the incip­
ient erotic response. Some fluidity between pre-genital 
responses remains, and gives rise to persistent polymorphous 
perverse reactions as well as increasing later castration 
problems (pp. 447-448).
Roiphe (1968) and Roiphe and Galenson (1973) have further empha­
sized that early preoedipal castration anxiety is an important factor in 
the genesis of fetish formation. These authors feel that a normal
17
preoedipal phallic activation is often evidenced during the second half 
of the second year of life. This early phallic arousal is consistent 
with the more traditional notions of the oedipal-phallic nature of the 
fetish. In addition they find that the opportunity to witness the ana­
tomical differences between the sexes is an accompanying factor to the 
preoedipal sexual arousal. A final feature involved is either a direct 
physical injury to the infant or mother, or general experience of an 
inadequate or not good-enough mothering situation, resulting in an 
"instability of the self and object representation" (p. 155). Case 
material based upon clinical observation of children seems to support 
the notion that the interaction of these factors can contribute to the 
emergence of an infantile fetish object (1973). Roiphe and Galenson 
(1975) in another case study were able to observe the adaptive and 
plastic nature of a transitional object for a young girl dealing with 
an apparent preoedipal castration problem induced through exposure to 
the anatomical sexual differences of her parents. When this was com­
pounded by an actual separation from her parents producing a severe 
separation trauma, the transitional object appeared to become inade­
quate and was replaced by a fetish object with more rigid adaptive 
value. It was also the target of aggression and served as a repara­
tive patch.
Differentiating Between the Fetish 
Object and Transitional Object
The distinguishing features between Winnicott's concept of 
transitional object and the apparent pathological nature of the fetish 
object have been delineated in certain respects, though both are
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Inanimate objects used to make certain adaptations in an illusory type 
way. Greenacre (1969) has viewed the transitional object and the fetish 
object in different lights. The most obvious and maybe the most impor­
tant distinction is that the transitional object serves a function in 
infancy while the fetish, in the traditional sense, does not appear 
before adolescence or adulthood. Though she sees this as an important 
difference, it is believed the fetish has its origins in early life due 
to various disturbances. On the other hand the transitional object 
which also has its roots in infancy is believed to be universal and 
healthy. Consideration of more intrapsychic factors may make these 
distinctions clear.
The transitional object, usually adopted by the infant in the
first year, is a symbolic creation of an area of experience between
mother and infant, in which the breast-object is markedly important.
In contrast the fetish object signifies a genital association between
infant and mother, founded apparently upon a disturbance in early
object relations compounded by later castration panic. Therefore,
though both originate in early life, their functions and purposes are
extremely different. The illusory or magical component of those two
types of inanimate object attachments are strikingly different as well.
The illusion and magic inherent in the fetish formation, appears to be
more complex than that of the transitional object. As Greenacre states,
This is a much more complicated magical procedure, related 
to fascination and self-hypnosis, than is true in the owner 
of the transitional object. It combines magical materiali­
zation and obliteration, a figurative bringing to life or 
killing, and it very much influences tumescence and detume­
scence (p. 162).
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While the transitional object is founded upon illusion as well, 
it gradually gives way and helps bridge one's experience in a reality 
oriented fashion. Though it eventually loses its importance it expands 
and takes on form in other areas of experience. In this manner the 
transitional object is plastic and maleable as it provides a buffer 
zone in the child's growing experience of disillusionment and adapta­
tions to reality. The fetish on the other hand is more concrete and 
narrow in its function, as it serves as a symbolic maternal phallus. 
Though its function is limited the fantasy aligned with it can be 
elaborate indeed.
Greenacre also contrasts the differential manifestations of 
aggression involved in fetish use as opposed to transitional object 
use. The transitional object which is born out of an early era of 
infancy is not ladened with introjected aggression. The transitional 
object depends on the illusion of omnipotence and good-enough mother­
ing. Rarely is the transitional object attacked with vicious hostil­
ity and aggressive impulses. The fetish, quite contrary to the transi­
tional object, abounds with repressed hostility, founded on the experi­
ence of severe castration panic. Accompanying the need for the fetish 
object in the sexual act is the not uncommon pervasiveness of sadomaso­
chistic tendencies. Greenacre concludes with an appropriate summation,
In closing I would emphasize that the transitional object is 
a temporary construction to aid the infant in the early 
stages of developing a sense of reality and establishing his 
own individual identity. It is of positive value in monitor­
ing growth and expansion. It is dispensed with, when it is 
no longer needed. In contrast, the fetish serves as a patch 
for a flaw in the genital area of the body image. While 
necessary for the approximation of an adequate sexual func­
tion, it is not otherwise useful. Like many patches it is
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circumscribed, aims to be durable, but is not always success­
ful. In that case it must be renewed, sometimes with even 
larger patches (p. 163).
Although these distinctions are significant, some attempt need 
to be made to resolve the various ways in which the previous investi­
gators have referred to what is considered a fetish object or transi­
tional object. Bak (1974) feels that much of what has been referred 
to as infantile fetishes and childhood fetishes does little to differ­
entiate the pathological nature of inanimate object usage from the 
normal aspects of growth inherent in the transitional object. This 
is evidenced in the narrow way some authors (Sperling 1963, Dickes 
1963) relegate any usage of an inanimate object to the realm of fet­
ishism leaving no room for its normal and healthy usage. Bak asserts, 
based on clinical consideration of the linkage of the fetish to the 
maternal phallus, that its genesis must be founded upon a "phase- 
specific" developmental sequence arising in the phallic-oedipal per­
iod. Early attachments to objects in the first year of life is incom­
patible with a fetish explanation, particularly of the phallic sort. 
Early object attachments that are apparently pathological may suggest 
a fetish of an oral nature rather than the phallic nature of the adult 
fetish or even the childhood fetish of later years. The infantile oral 
fetish founded in the not good-enough mothering situation of overfrus­
tration and overstimulation with the concommitant encouragement of an 
object by the mother in lieu of herself, may represent a quite differ­
ent genetic component, related to vicissitudes in weaning (Greenacre 
1970).
Bak (1974) has also pointed out, as has Greenacre (1970) that 
the examples Dickes and Sperling have offered in their arguments for
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the fetishlstic nature of inanimate object attachments were far from 
typical examples of the ubiquitous transitional object. These objects 
were often imposed from the outside on the infant and not developed and 
relegated to special importance by the infant’s own creative process. 
This also seems to be the case with Buxbaum's (1960) attempt to relate 
"intermediary objects," those given by the parent or therapist, to the 
transitional object. Some of Wulff's (1946) examples seem to be sub­
ject of similar criticism.
Dickes (1978) has somewhat reconciled his differences with 
Winnicott's concept of transitional object and his ox«i early consid­
erations of the fetish as he now allows room for normal object usage. 
His main objection appears to be to Winnicott’s position that the true 
transitional object even surpasses the mother in importance. Such 
extreme attachments he finds pathological and fetishistic. The transi­
tional object, he believes, should be reserved for those children who 
use the object in a moderate way, when confronted with separation or 
anxiety for instance, but do not place its importance above the mother.
It is apparent though, that the large number of children with 
so called fetishes reflects an inconsistency with the small number of 
adult fetishists (A. Freud 1965). It seems most plausible that two 
separate processes are in operation.
Theoretical Considerations
Winnicott's formulations of transitional objects and transi­
tional phenomena serve as the basis for all subsequent speculations 
about this fascinating "third area" of life. His ability to delineate 
this area of experience demonstrated a keenness for discovering
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psychological importance in a ubiquitous childhood activity. As 
Stevenson (1954) stated, "the commonplace and the everyday has once 
again proved exciting in its implications. The diversity and richness 
of individual experience, which yet comes within the terms of 'normal­
ity' can never fail to challenge the student of psychology" (p. 216). 
Though much has been written and speculated about the nature of the 
transitional object since Winnicott's (1953) original publication, 
nearly all is an extention of his basic postulates. Here attention 
will be directed toward a greater understanding of the origins, devel­
opment, and function of the transitional object in the normal develop­
mental sequence as well as the nature of its fate for the individual.
Winnicott's conceptions of the mother-infant interaction pro­
vided room within psychoanalytic theory for the consideration of normal 
and healthy modes of functioning. It is the transitional modes of 
experience which appear to incorporate that area in which the world is 
experienced with active vigor and a sense of wholeness. The roots of 
this developmental sequence, Winnicott (1971) suggests, arise out of 
the mothering experience, not as a means of forced adaptation to real­
ity, but rather as a fulfilling encounter with the real world. The 
mother is not viewed as merely the provider of need deficits and 
instinctual desires, but also as a provider of contact and creative 
"primary illusion" which forms the basis for transitional experience. 
This foundation is based upon experience with the "holding mother" or 
"environmental mother" as Winnicott so aptly termed it.
Kestenberg (1978) and Kestenberg and Weinstein (1978) have 
focused upon the neurophysiological underpinnings of the holding
23
experience (i.e., the earliest mother-infant interactions of contact) 
and the psychological aspects of this early contact as it is related 
to body image formation and the origin and development of transitional 
objects.
Kestenberg (1978) has proposed a relationship between the acti­
vation of the Gamma Nervous System (GNS) which functions through the 
body meridians (similar to Chinese accupuncture lines) to serve as the 
psychophysiological basis of the formation of the body image and the 
later interactions with the transitional object. More specifically, 
the GNS is that part of the nervous system related to subcortical 
functions dominantly expressed in the earliest tactile experiences of 
life. The holding environment activates the system through the body 
meridians and provides the infant with his earliest psychophysiologi­
cal experiences. The GNS is set in motion by the stretching and breath­
ing of the organism or what is referred to as "outgoingness." This 
movement outward when experienced positively, provides a sense of trust, 
free of anxiety, and is related to the sense of movement into the envi­
ronment in vital active form. This positive environmental state or 
"eutony" is achieved through outgoingness or what is referred to as 
"transsensus." The state of transsensus is a state of being whole and 
connected, a viable part of the holding environment, which provides the 
rudiments of a durable body image formation. This state of "transsensus 
outgoingness" is initiated prenatally, further activated through birth 
and later still in the holding environment. The acquisition of a transi 
tional object can be viewed as a further part of this developmental 
sequence. Kestenberg adroitly expresses this relationship in the 
following:
24
Holding the transitional object, and imagining that it holds him, 
stroking it and making it stroke his face while sucking, are 
all conducive to the maintenance of a special state of conscious­
ness, which is at the borderland between internal and external 
reality. The soothing rhythms of the sucking dull the sharp 
intrusion of reality, while the transsensus, based on being held 
and touched as well as on holding and touching, prevents the 
engulfment of the "nothingness" of sleep. The play action with 
the transitional object is the external manifestation of related­
ness, the basic core of fantasy that weaves illusion into every­
day life (p. 71).
The physiological base for this type of creativity in the inter­
mediate zone between mother and child is the activation of the 
GNS, which, through its hypothalmic connection, regulates the 
hormonal, stimulating-dulling, and waking-sleep centers, as well 
as all other rhythemic regulators of bodily needs. Through its 
connections via the hypothalamus to the cortex, the comfort giv­
ing, body-image building creativity becomes transformed into 
play and art— the individual's gift to society. Transsensus, 
the ideomotor, affective component of body-image building, 
remains the core of all relationships. Transitional phenomena, 
the beloved possessions, allow the individual to dilute the 
intensity of his feelings for his love object and to make the 
rhythm of loss and retrieval of the object, the principle ingre­
dient of the uniquely human achievement- creativity based on 
sameness and leading to change (p. 71).
Kestenberg and Weinstein (1978) further explored the nature of 
body-image formation and transitional object development as developmen­
tal products of the non-nutritive aspects of the "holding environment." 
These experiences of being part of and secure in one's world while 
actively engaging it flow from the fulfilling experiences of trans­
sensus. This activity is derived through holding and touching provides 
the illusion of the soothing qualities of mother infant contact. These 
rhythmic activities structure a sound body image and provide the founda­
tion for the recapitulation of this state in play with the transitional 
object as it serves to restore the sense of wholeness and soothing of 
the intermediate zone between mother and infant. The transitional 
object is experienced as part of the infant, as comforting, and thus 
providing the illusion of the recreation of the mother as well as
narcissistic creation of the self. This creative activity, though 
founded in being alone (i.e., the mother's absence), is soon experi­
enced as fulfillment and wholeness. As Kestenberg and Weinstein state, 
"The yearning for reunion is overcome by illusions, fantasies, and body 
memories, all related to the first formation of psychic content (trans- 
sensus) in the intermediate area, which bridges the gap between inter­
nal and external reality" (p. 90).
Deri (1978) extends the importance of the earliest tactile 
experiences which are involved in the development of the body-image 
and the delineation of the surface between inner and outer reality, 
to the symbolization process which functions as a means to transcend 
this boundary. The experience of good tactile sensations induces in 
the infant good feelings within one's boundaries and correspondingly 
outside as well. The mediation of this experience between inner and 
outer reality is, according to Deri, communication in its most rudi­
mentary form and hence a symbolization process. Deri further suggests 
that the area of experience which develops from the earliest tactile 
experiences may be thought of as the "predecessor of the 'mind,' which 
corresponds more or less to what is called the preconscious, the store­
house of symbolic internal representations" (p. 56). The transitional 
object also serves a function in this framework. Its use represents a 
symbolic creative process by the infant but are important in the devel­
opment of higher symbolic activity. This occurs as the transitional 
object itself, begins to lose importance for the child. Its creative 
function survives though, and is expanded as its symbolic qualities 
become integrated into the preconscious. Its internalization is thus 
a kind of "fertilizer" for the development of further symbolic growth.
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An important aspect of consideration in fully understanding the 
function of the transitional object is its role in the development of 
the infant's cognitive as well as psychological growth. Its onset of 
appearance within the first year of life, seems to indicate the presence 
of basic cognitive and memory skills. Also occurring within the first 
year, at a very similar time, is the appearance of separation anxiety in 
the infant. The nature of such manifestations appears to imply indica­
tions of object constancy. Various authors though, as reviewed by 
Fraiberg (1969), attribute object constancy to quite different periods 
ranging from 6 to 24 months. The discrepancy appears to be in the 
actual definition of what constitutes object constancy. Fraiberg has 
suggested that this discrepancy is due to the lack of delineation 
between libidinal object constancy and cognitive object constancy. The 
libidinal tie that is established by the infant to the mother is believed 
to occur within the first year of life. It is the notion of cognitive 
object constancy which requires higher mental representational capacities, 
allowing the infant to produce the mother's image in her absence, that 
develops at a later period (i.e., the second half of the second year). 
Fraiberg has proposed a distinction between "recognition" and "evocative" 
aspects of memory to help clarify this issue. Although the infant can­
not evoke the image of the external stimulus within the first year, the 
capacity to recognize it in the presence of the object is still possible. 
Thus, the separation anxiety experienced at approximately 6-8 months may 
be a response reflecting the lack of recognition of unknown or unfamiliar 
objects which fail to restimulate memory traces that have been highly 
cathected (i.e., the mother's face). The evocation of highly cathected
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images in the absence of the loved object during the second year repre­
sents a different process. The latter experience would be more highly 
developed where self and other are more clearly differentiated. This 
response may be more closely related to the aspects of separation 
experienced during rapprochement as defined by Mahler (1972).
Metcalf and Spitz (1978) view the transitional object as a 
critical component in the development from recognition memory to evo­
cative memory. The authors suggest that the development of transi­
tional objects of transitional phenomena from the onset of recognition 
memory at about 6 months to the establishment of evocative memory at 
approximately 24 months represents an actual stage in development.
The function served by the transitional object is essentially one 
that helps evoke the mother's image with its concommitant pleasant 
memory traces and sense of security in her absence. The transitional 
object is described as a "quasi-evocative stimulus." The transitional 
object is basically experienced by the infant as a substitute libidinal 
object, a structure which soothes and is reassuring and protective.
The development and function of the transitional object is stated 
clearly in the following:
Accordingly, it is to be expected that the transitional object 
will arise at a state at which the constitution of the libidinal 
object proper is not yet complete. The transitional object will 
carry even over into the often tempestuous vicissitudes of 
object relations the climate of that golden age in which the 
unambivialant signal, "need gratification," represented the 
relief of need tension. We therefore feel justified in postu­
lating the establishment of the transitional object as a spe­
cific stage in the progress from recognition of a sign gestalt 
to evocation through a volitional act of mentation. It is a 
stage in the natural history of object development (p. 105).
The resultant development of the transitional object has been 
suggested by Metcalf and Spitz to culminate in two differing directions.
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With the onset of evocation the transitional object may be disregarded 
by the child. Retaining it though, at this time, signifies a change 
in its functions which is believed to "lead to the highest levels of 
imaginative objectification" (p. 106).
The eventual fate of the transitional object has been one 
aspect of its overall manifestation that has been subject to great 
debate. Winnicott (1953) originally proposed that is does not "go 
inside" but is eventually "decathected" and "relegated to limbo."
Many authors have taken exception to that explanation, most notably 
Tolpin (1971). According to Tolpin the self-regulatory soothing 
functions of the transitional object do eventually "go inside" and 
become internalized as psychic structure. It was her application 
of Kohut's (1971) concept of "transmuting internalization" that has 
represented the most significant modification of Winnicott's theori­
zation of transitional objects. Kohut's concept of transmuting inter­
nalization reflects the process in which narcissistically invested 
object cathexes gradually become internalized as psychic structure. 
This occurs through small "optimal" frustrating experiences in which 
previously experienced illusions of omnipotence and total security 
fade and become less frequent. These soothing narcissistic qualities 
are first reestablished through the soothing qualities of transitional 
experiences which can revoke the symbiotic fusion. Later the transi­
tional objects themselves are internalized through the same process, 
as reality adaptation develops through separation-individuation.
Thus, the function of the transitional object is to provide a "transi­
tional form of mental structure" (Tolpin 1971, p. 327). Later the 
more mature ego can provide the needed soothing itself, without the
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aid of the transitional object, while further allowing more mature men­
tal structure to develop. As Tolpin states, "it is the cathexis, opti­
mal loss, and internalization of supporting mental functions which 
build the ego during infancy" (p. 331).
The Creative Element
Though much has been discussed about the importance of the tran­
sitional stage of development within the realm of normal and psychologi­
cal growth for the very young child, its impact ranges far beyond those 
aspects related to infancy and early childhood.
The illusion of having created one's special possession provides 
the young child with a positive means of negotiating inner and outer 
reality. This illusion serves as a bridge between the growing sense of 
self and the external world. The gradual diminuation of importance of 
the transitional object allows it to take on new properties as that 
area of inner and outer experience is explored in play and throughout 
the entire "cultural field" (Winnicott 1953). It is this conceptuali­
zation of the transitional object that emphasizes its importance in 
creative activity.
Rose (1978) views the transitional object as "an early, con­
crete manifestation of the transitional process" (p. 352). It is the 
transitional process which reflects the creative interactional capac­
ities employed to interweave the inside and outside worlds. Rose 
expresses this transitional process in the following:
As in its early form as the transitional object, the transi­
tional process in its developed form as the creative imagin­
ation remains an essential instrument of adaptation. It 
samples the pluralism of reality, withdraws and readvances,
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attempting to abstract coherent configurations composed of 
self and non-self elements. They bridge the out-there with 
the in-here in new ideas and images. In contrast to repres­
sion and denial, these abstractions offer new perspectives 
from which to explore and enhance rather than circumscribe 
the appreciation of reality (p. 354).
The transitional process is thus not limited to only early 
childhood, but involves creative interaction with the world. One's 
adaptations take on a creative flavor as this process permeates one’s 
experiential field.
The notion of creative living should not be confused with the 
production of what are considered "artistic" or "creative" works. The 
emphasis here is on "process" and not "products" (Beres 1960). This 
envelopes one's creative imagination and spontaneity, as well as a 
sense of being and participating in everyday life. It does not elim­
inate though, creativity that culminates in a product of one's expres­
sion.
Dinnage (1978) emphasizes the early symbolic activity, as 
described by Winnicott in transitional objects and transitional phe­
nomena, as a needed reformulation of old psychoanalytic notions of 
creativity. Rather than viewing creativity as the sublimation of 
instinctual desires, with its negative connotations, creativity is 
placed within a perspective of positive enjoyment through spontaneous 
activity. It is truly a satisfying experience with the world. The 
"illusion" of the creative act need not be restricted by the negative 
implications of illusion as the absence of reality. From a Winnicot- 
tian viewpoint "illusion" takes on new meaning, one based on trust and 
confirmation of one's existence and being in the world. The illusion 
gradually gives way to greater reality testing, but the sense of having
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"made" one's world remains in a still viable form which becomes expressed 
in creative play and later throughout one's mediation with the cultural 
environment. As Dinnage suggests: "The key to making things, then, is 
concurrence, when what the child expects and what the world offers inter­
sects, the object is both found and created at the same moment" (p. 370). 
When this illusion fails to form there exists, "the opposite of concur­
rence, of the cooperation between outside 'thereness' and inner expecta­
tion, is the sense of total unrecognizability, entire strangeness, which 
is nightmare and madness" (p. 371).
Clinical Applications of the Transitional Object
Winnicott's concept of the transitional object has provided a new 
and valuable way of understanding childhood development particularly in 
relation to the separation-individuation process. Its clinical applica­
tions to individuals having experienced difficulties during this period 
allows unique insights into their level of psychic functioning. This is 
evident in early childhood psychopathology as well as in the psycho­
pathology of the adult. In addition, it provides the clinician with a 
framework in which to deal with these problems. This is apparent when 
one tries to understand the level of object relations of such individuals.
The usefulness of Winnicott's formulations become especially 
critical when attempting to deal with individuals with severe character- 
ological disturbances as seen in many borderline and psychotic patients. 
Here the focus is upon structural defects that interfere with normal 
psychological development and the attainment of higher ego integration.
Furer (1964) related the "psychotic fetish" of a symbiotic psy­
chotic boy to aspects of Winnicott's transitional object. Here the
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inanimate object was imbued with aspects of the self but only for short 
periods of time. The psychotic state seemed to shift to a transitional 
level of functioning and back again to an autistic state of withdrawal. 
Furer was able by consistently meeting the needs of the child to pro­
gress him from his symbiotic state into a transitional level of func­
tioning and beyond. This was seen in his preoccupation with his feces, 
which represented the boy's ability to differentiate objects from him­
self, at least partially. His feces appeared to take on qualities of 
a transitional object.
Fintzy (1971), in his treatment of a borderline child, sug­
gested apparent fixation at the level of transitional object develop­
ment. Indicative of childhood borderline states, he believes, is the 
prolonged use of the object as well as the ready ability of other 
inanimate objects to take its place. The transitional object became 
a focal point of the therapeutic situation in an effort to extend 
separation beyond this level.
Another instance of the fixation at the transitional object 
stage was described in a somewhat more unusual case of a self- 
mutilating teenage girl (Kafka 1969). The patient seemingly treated 
her body as some part not-me object. Cutting her body and feeling 
the soothing of the warm blood was actually described by this girl 
in similar terms as transitional objects are often referred. In this 
particular case an early skin disease in infancy and the lack of tac­
tile contact allowed this girl, Kafka suggests, may have libdinalized 
the skin surface and lead to its fixation as a kind of transitional
obj ect.
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Modell (1963) related the transitional level of object rela­
tions to both the adult borderline conditions and to schizophrenia.
The major difference between these disturbances may be due to some 
biological factor involved in schizophrenia. In schizophrenia this 
biological factor may combine with a failure of normal psychological 
structure to develop, to produce a deficit in development beyond the 
transitional level and may create the subsequent withdrawal from the 
world of reality in times of stress. The psychological structure of 
the borderline individual is similar, as it only appears to be of a 
transitional level but does not disintegrate, at times, to extreme 
withdrawal states as seen in the schizophrenic. It should be noted 
that in both of these conditions the level of object relations is 
never an all or none affair.
Kahne (1967) related 3 cases of borderline individuals to vari­
ous vicissitudes in early object relations, particularly those of the 
transitional object stage. The manner in which these patients used 
inanimate objects in times of stress and threat in the analytic set­
ting suggested such an etiology. The use of these objects, Kahne 
believes, reflects a primitive attempt by the ego to deal with prob­
lems inherent in the separation process.
Coppolillo (1967) in a clinical study found disturbances in a 
patient's ability to engage in this third area of experience as a 
result of an imposing mother who interfered with normal transitional 
object usage in her son's development. By not allowing the child to 
experience this area of life deficits were incurred in adulthood in 
what might be considered the normal extention of the transitional 
area, or ongoing transitional process.
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Kaminer (1978) also described a clinical case in which the 
patient's mother directly interfered into the activities and experi­
ences of her daughter in the transitional realm. By imposing herself, 
rather than allowing the patient to experience this area, the mother 
disrupted the normal separation-individuation process. This inter­
rupted the normal internalization of soothing functions into psychic 
structure. Kaminer suggests such an outcome reduces an individual's 
frustration tolerance in later life.
Volkan (1973), in the analysis of a narcissistic patient found 
various fantasy material presented to be related to Winnicott's con­
cept of the transitional object. These fantasies were used similarly 
as a child would use and manipulate his transitional object. The 
transitional fantasies provided the patient with a means of prevent­
ing the regression to a total fusion or symbiotic state. With them, 
inner and outer reality could be mediated. Working through the needed 
use of these transitional fantasies was a key part of the analysis.
In the analytic treatment of 3 males with narcissistic charac­
teristics and homosexual tendencies, Natterson (1976) found these 
patients viewed themselves as their own transitional objects. They 
frequently saw themselves as "dolls" in a manner that strongly resem­
bled one's interaction with a transitional object. It seems that these 
patients had to provide their own narcissistically soothing cathexes in 
the form of their own bodies. In addition to the doll fantasies of 
themselves they had an inordinate preoccupation with clothing them­
selves and decorating their surroundings. The analyses focused upon 
pregenital fixations and the use of their own bodies as transitional
35
objects. In each case fixation seemed to have occurred at the symbiotic 
stage with the mother. By never separating from the mother strong femi­
nine identifications were produced.
Volkan and Kavanaugh (1978) in their clinical work also view 
the borderline patient as functioning at the object relations stage 
fluctuating between transitional experience and symbiosis. The analy­
tic focus upon these early separation foxations they found, reactivated 
the use of transitional objects. In these cases it was in the form of 
attachments to cats.
Giovacchini (1978) also views transitional experiences as criti­
cal for the psychic growth of borderline and psychotic individuals. The 
development of primary psychic creativity, which is founded in optimal 
mothering experiences, is only minimally developed in these individuals. 
The delusional states these persons show, he suggests, are used to avoid 
early trauma states that have interrupted the normal developmental 
sequence.
Parrish (1978) describes a case in which one twin uses the 
other as a transitional object, but not quite at the immature level 
seen in more borderline states. Parrish has hypothesized that this 
transitional relationship was of a secondary type as distinguished by 
Busch, Nagera, McKnight and Pezzarossi (1973).
Solomon (1962) has related the fixed ideas of the obsessive 
compulsive individual to a kind of "internalized transitional object." 
Just as the transitional object provides mediation of the separation- 
individuation process, the fixed idea becomes a way of retaining the 
link to the mother. The fixed idea is pathological though, as it is
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a means of splitting aspects of the non-gratifying mother to provide 
safety to the self. These thoughts are founded upon conflict and 
threat and must be preserved in a fixed form to protect the budding 
ego. The fixed idea is thus a way in which consistency can be met 
when it has been lacking.
These previously mentioned studies all suggest the transitional 
object level of object relations of severely disturbed individuals. 
Other reports have looked at the transitional nature of the therapeutic 
interaction as well as the analytic setting.
Searles (1975) suggested that the symptoms themselves of 
severely disturbed individuals to be transitional in nature as they 
are means of negotiating one's inner and outer reality. He also 
feels that the symptoms become transitional objects for the therapist 
as they interact and influence the manner the patient is dealt with.
Other clinicians have viewed the therapeutic situation as 
analogous to transitional experience. Greenbaum (1978) characterized 
the interaction between the analyst and patient, when ideal and work­
ing, as akin to the experience with the transitional object. The 
therapist and patient come together and interact in an inbetween area 
of experience. This occurs as the therapist becomes the transitional 
object for the patient as his sensitivity meets, almost magically, the 
needs and concerns of the patient.
Greenson (1978) describes further clinical material in which 
patients use the analytic setting as a transference transitional 
object. It seems that the analyst and the room provide certain sooth­
ing functions which initiate a transference state of previous transi­
tional experience.
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In another interesting report Grolnick (1978) attempts to link 
the dream to aspects of transitional phenomena. It appears to him that 
the dream "is a refueling with representations first of the original 
fusions with the part-object breast, then of the mother, and finally 
of transitional objects; that is, regression in the dream occurs at all 
available developmental levels" (p. 219). It Is the transitional object 
stage that Grolnick suggests may be a significant "resting place." 
Understanding of dreams, at times, as transitional experiences can 
allow the dream material to be dealt with more insightfully in therapy. 
This was evident in Grolnick's patient as dreams were used defensively 
and in a transitional manner to deal with the threatening nature of the 
analytic setting.
It is apparent that the clinical applicability of the transi­
tional object concept is theoretically as well as practically useful 
for the clinician. The preeence of such phenomena among borderline 
and psychotic patients points to the importance of the normal progres­
sion of transitional experience for healthy psychological functioning.
In addition, disruptions and fixations in its normal development prove 
devastating for the psychological well being and growth of the individ­
ual.
Empirical Findings
Although a great deal has been written about the transitional 
object and transitional phenomena, most has been of the theoretical 
and speculative domain with little in the way of true empirical inves­
tigation. Most of this research in turn has been limited to descrip­
tive assessments of transitional objects. This in part is due to the
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rather diverse and multitudinous manifestations of transitional phe­
nomena making such investigation difficult. Winnicott also pointed 
out that by focusing upon concrete examples of such phenomena, such 
as the blanket and teddy bear, that one might lose sight of the more 
encompassing aspect of this human area of experience. Often there 
may be no readily apparent existence of the employment of a transi­
tional object by the child. As suggested by Winnicott, the "sequence 
may nevertheless be broken or maintained in a hidden way" (p. 91). 
Winnicott also felt that at times the mother herself could function 
as a transitional object. One essential feature that Winnicott did 
feel to be inherent in a true transitional object is that it be, at 
times, "more important than the mother" (p. 92). This acknowledges 
that the attachment to the object may be more significant to the 
child in times of stress than the mother. Its function is thus one 
that is "soothing" and not merely a "comfort" to the infant or young 
child.
Stevenson (1954) was the first to systematically assess some 
of the dimensions of attachments formed to special objects by young 
children. Based upon survey data collected from mothers' clubs from 
various parts of England she was able to distinguish several findings. 
The data assessed various features of the transitional object, the 
families' attitudes toward them, as well as background and history of 
the children's functioning and development. First, no sex differences 
were found or apparent personality differences among the children with 
transitional objects. Also a distinction was made between "primary" 
objects, the first possession formed during infancy and "secondary"
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object attachments at about 2-3 years of age with the first considered 
the transitional object or "first not me possession" as referred by 
Winnicott. While the latter may not be the true transitional object 
it is believed to be a further step toward the development of mature 
object relationships.
Later investigations (Gaddini 1970; Ekecrantz and Rudhe 1972; 
Busch et al. 1973; Rudhe and Ekecrantz 1974; Busch 1974; and Hong and 
Townes 1976) provide some of the most complete assessments of transi­
tional phenomena in the psychoanalytic literature. (Also see review 
by Hong 1978).
Gaddini (1970) compared three different social groups in Italy, 
in relation to the formation of a transitional object. The groups con­
sisted of a rural group living outside of Rome, a group in the city 
itself, and a group composed of foreign children living in Rome of 
Anglo-Saxon background. The findings showed significant differences 
among the groups in terms of the actual attachments by the children 
to transitional objects. While 61.5% of the foreign group showed such 
attachments, only 31.1% of those in the Rome group and 4.9% of the 
rural group displayed an attachment. The progression to a transitional 
object appeared negatively correlated with breast feeding, duration of 
breast feeding, sleeping in parents' bed or room, precursor's (fingers), 
and being rocked. Self rocking on the other hand was somewhat corre­
lated with the use of a transitional object.
Busch et al. (1973) focused upon attachments infants form dur­
ing the first year of life or what they refer to as primary transitional 
objects. Based upon observations and interviews these authors found 
67.5% of the children to have transitional objects. These attachments
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were evaluated based upon strict criteria as to what constitutes a 
transitional object. These include such things as: its presence 
during the first year of life; its use for a somewhat lasting dura­
tion (1 year or longer); its "soothing" quality; its distinction 
from an object of primary oral need gratification; its discovery by 
the child and not imposed by the parents; and its distinction from 
the infant's use of parts of its own body for comfort. A factor 
apparently found to be very important of the transitional object is 
its tactile qualities. This seems quite consonant with the features 
surrounding Gaddini's (1970) investigation of the transitional object. 
Busch et al. have also found that these early attachments appear to be 
persistent with only 10% of the children between 2-5 apparently giving 
up their object.
Ekecrantz and Rudhe (1972) assessed the dimensions of transi­
tional phenomena, which they defined as "anything-behavior or object- 
that habitually comforts the child" (p. 263), in areas focusing upon 
incidence, various forms of the phenomena as well as the functions 
they serve. From their data based upon interviews of mothers with 
three children (age groups from 1% -16 years), their results indi­
cated that 74% of the children used or previously used something con­
sidered to be a transitional phenomena (83.2% before age of one year). 
The emotional atmosphere between mother and child appeared to be sig­
nificantly related to the occurrence of transitional phenomena. More 
specifically, the more positive the relationship was evaluated the 
greater the likelihood of the use by the child of transitional phe­
nomena. It was also found the transitional phenomena onset appears
41
to be related to the time of weaning. The authors also attempted to 
relate variables of ego status, and development such as independency, 
frustration tolerance and cultural and artistic interests, with transi­
tional phenomena occurrence and duration. No differences were found 
though.
In a later study by Rudhe and Ekecrantz (1974) in which they 
refined their definition of transitional phenomena, eliminating move­
ments directed by the child to his or her own body, they found 59.7% 
of the children to have transitional phenomena. In addition 73% 
exhibited these phenomena before 1 year of age. Of all the children 
with transitional phenomena 21.7% displayed multiple transitional phe­
nomena. The authors also found that at 6 years of age half the chil­
dren with earlier transitional phenomena still displayed them.
Hong and Townes (1976) in a cross cultural study of infants' 
attachments to transitional objects found findings similar to those 
of Gaddini (1970). Three groups were evaluated: these were American 
children, Korean children reared in America, and Korean children 
reared in Korea. The incidence of apparent transitional object 
attachments were revealed to be 53.9% for the American children, 34% 
for the Korean children in America and 18.3% for the Korean children 
in Korea. Factors contributing to these differences have been attrib­
uted to differences in child rearing practices. These are particularly 
divergent in terms of the activities involving the mother and infant at 
bedtime, such as sleeping arrangements, breast feeding and mother- 
infant contact and care. Korean children raised in Korea more often 
slept with the mother, nursed themselveB to sleep and had greater
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opportunity to be in contact with the mother physically. These factors 
were less prevalent in the Korean children in America and even markedly 
less so in the American group.
One clinically related empirical study (Horton, Louy, and 
Coppolillo 1974) compared the ability of individuals with personality 
disorders to experience within the transitional realm with the ability 
of control subjects to do so. This capacity to experience "transitional 
relatedness" was essentially absent in those persons with personality 
disorders while the comparison group demonstrated this ability in 93% 
of the cases. Assessment of transitional relatedness was done through 
interviews focusing upon both the presence of transitional objects in 
early childhood and the ability in the present to use "soothing illu­
sion" in, for example, in one's interactions with their family, reli­
gion, and work. The results also indicated a lack of transitional 
objects in the early life of those individuals with personality dis­
orders (83% gave no indication of such an attachment).
Some experimental studies, often overlooked in the psycho­
analytic literature until Hongs (1978) recent integration of these 
various aspects of study within a more comprehensive framework, 
reveal significant aspects of special object attachments.
Gershaw and Schwarz (1971) found that when small children 
experienced separation from the mother due to her absence in an 
experimental setting that their distress was not alleviated by 
familiar objects brought from home. No distinguishing criteria 
were made though, between these objects and the special attachments 
apparent with the transitional object.
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Weisberg and Russell (1971) investigated the role of blanket 
attachments and its preference to other objects in the experimental 
setting. The findings suggest greater interaction by the child with 
his or her own blanket, than to an unfamiliar blanket, a familiar 
piece of clothing from home, or a foam cushion. This was also evi­
dent even in the presence of the mother.
Passman and Weisman (1975) in a large study involving 64 chil­
dren, half of whom were attached to blankets, found similar functions 
between the blanket and the mother. Those children attached to blankets 
and exposed to them played with little or no stress in a novel situation, 
comparable to those children unattached to a blanket and in the mother's 
presence. The unattached children exhibited greater distress when 
exposed to blankets or familiar toys or no objects and left to play 
and explore a novel situation. Clearly, the capacity of the blankets 
to provide functions similar to those provided by the mother for the 
attached children was evident.
From the empirical literature significant differences appear 
among children attached to special objects as opposed to those that 
are not. These are generally supportive of the theoretical and clini­
cal literature that views the transitional object as a critical feature 
in the psychological development of the child. Although many theore­
ticians prefer not to separate specific transitional object attachments 
from the broader perspective of transitional phenomena, it may be use­
ful to do so. That is, the "creation" of a concrete object may differ 
significantly from less conspicuous transitional phenomena, such as a 
sound, idea or even another person such as the mother or a sibling.
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Consideration of both as aspects of transitional experience on a con­
tinuum may be more fruitful. Though there may be more plasticity to 
certain things considered transitional phenomena, the control one has 
over a particular object may be more fully and directly experienced 
for the child in his or her growing need to learn to mediate the 
reality of the external world.
The Focus of This Study
The nature of the present study has been to focus upon the 
transitional object, per se, as it functions in the above mentioned 
developmental capacity and the relationship it has to one's function­
ing as an adult. Consideration has been directed toward whether the 
person having created a transitional object during his or her early 
childhood will have negotiated the separation-individuation process 
more adequately than those who did not have such an object attach­
ment. Specifically, attention has been focused towards the impact 
of one's early object attachments on the individual's psychological 
functioning as an adult. The literature suggests that the child who 
has created a transitional object is actively engaged in the 
separation-individuation process while symbolically recreating the 
lost symbiosis with the mother. The transitional object is thus 
functioning to provide an intermediate area of experience that is 
unchallenged and under the control of the child. It does this by 
maintaining the sense of control experienced in the symbiotic state 
but gradually taking on new forms as differentiation proceeds. The 
transitional object is believed to help in the development of the
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individual's object relations as well as in the promotion of mature 
personality functioning.
This study has attempted to demonstrate some relationships 
between the presence of a transitional object in early childhood and 
certain related aspects of functioning in early adulthood as measured 
by several tests and scales. The particular measures used to assess 
differences in functioning between the Transitional Object Group and 
the No Transitional Object Group were chosen for this study for sev­
eral reasons. First, these scales appear to be the most widely 
explored and most frequently used measures of some of the dimensions 
being explored in this study. These include such aspects as the 
degree of psychological differentiation, sense of control over one's 
environment, as well as various personality variables that may be 
related to the absence or presence of transitional object attachment. 
Through a closer examination of the individual tests used (The 
Internal-External Scale, The Group Embedded Figures Test, The This 
I Believe Test, and The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire), 
their relationship to the areas of exploration in this study will 
become more evident.
The Internal-External (I-E) Scale as developed by Rotter 
(1966) was employed to assess the degree to which an individual 
feels in control over contingencies in their environment. An indi­
vidual with an internal locus of control will attribute responsibil­
ity for his interactions and outcomes with the environment to him­
self. The individual with an external locus of control will attrib­
ute the controlling factors to the environment rather than to his
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own skill and ability. This reflects a tendency to rely on chance and 
fate rather than to one's own resources. It was hypothesized that per­
sons having created transitional objects in early childhood will demon­
strate greater internal locus of control than those who did not form 
such an attachment.
The Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) was administered as a 
means of assessing dimensions of psychological differentiation (Witkin, 
Oltman, Raskin and Karp 1971). The cognitive dimensions of field 
dependence-independence and globality-articulation which this test 
assesses have been related to the psychological dimensions of body 
concept, sense of identity, and the nature of psychological defenses. 
Field independent persons appear to have a more clearly defined sense 
of self and body boundaries and also show greater separateness in 
their identity sense as demonstrated in the ability to differentiate 
aspects and feelings of self from other. Field independent persons 
have also been suggested to use more well defined defense mechanisms 
than field dependent persons. Relationships also exist between field 
independence-dependence and types of psychopathology. It was hypoth­
esized that those individuals with transitional objects will demon­
strate greater field independence and articulation of functioning 
than those without transitional objects.
The This I Believe Test (TIB) was another measure administered 
to assess psychological differentiation as based upon a concreteness- 
abstractness dimension. The scale measures this dimension through the 
belief system of the individual as an interaction of ego-involving con­
tent material and one's level of concreteness-abstractness. Four
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belief systems have been delineated which assess the psychological 
aspects of degrees of individuation (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder 1961). 
System 1; These individuals show a general cognitive style 
which reflects poor integration and differentiation. They 
tend to be dependent on external sources of authority, 
inflexible, rule oriented, and highly conventional with a 
strong need for structure.
System 2; These individuals are characterized by a nega- 
tivistic and anti-authoritarian nature. There is a con­
spicuous struggle for independence, yet it is tempered with 
the fear of rejection and loss of security and control.
They are somewhat more differentiated than the System 1 
individual though still poorly integrated.
System 3: These individuals are characterized by stable 
interpersonal relationships which provides them with a 
sense of control over their environment. These relation­
ships do reflect though, a dependent and manipulative 
quality, which is the primary basis for their sense of 
control. There still remains some sense of vulnerability 
to rejection.
System 4: These individuals reflect the highest level of 
abstract functioning. They tend to demonstrate indepen­
dence without accompanying negative attitudes, internal 
systems of control, a willingness to take novel approaches 
to situations, and flexibility to change.
It was hypothesized that those persons with transitional 
objects will show higher levels of differentiation as measured by
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these system levels than persons without transitional object attach­
ments .
The TIB was also used in another fashion that is somewhat 
afield from its intended design. The nature of the content with 
its highly ego Involving material seemed to make it an appropriate 
means of tapping aspects of "transitional relatedness," which is 
the ability to function in the transitional realm of experience.
This aspect of the TIB was included after the original design of 
this study.
Certain aspects of transitional relatedness have been explored 
in an earlier study comparing a clinical population to a control com­
parison group along this dimension (Horton et al. 1974). Again it was 
hypothesized that those persons having had transitional objects would 
demonstrate greater features of transitional relatedness than those 
persons not having had such attachments.
The final tool implemented in assessing differences between 
those individuals having had transitional objects and those without 
transitional objects was the Sixteen Personality Factor (16PF) Ques­
tionnaire (Cattell and Eber 1957). It is a comprehensive evaluation 
of personality variables. The questionnaire was used in an explora­
tory fashion and no predictions were made between the personality 
characteristics of persons having created a transitional object in 




The subjects were 37 undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course. They were selected from 278 subjects 
who had filled out a questionnaire (appendix A) about the nature of 
special inanimate object attachments they may or may not have had as 
small children. Of the 37 subjects used in the study, 19 (8 male,
11 female) had transitional objects while 18 (9 male, 9 female) did 
not.
The screening process of subject selection was based upon a 
combination of self-reports and parental-reports as a means of cross 
validation. From self reports of the 278 initial subjects, 107 were 
selected. Of the 107 subjects, 55 had transitional objects while 52 
gave no indication of a transitional object. The criteria used for 
determining those with transitional objects in early childhood from 
those without such attachments were the following:
Transitional Object Group: This group consisted of those 
persons indicating a strong, singular attachment to a par­
ticular object that occurred rather early in life, usually 
during the first year, and persisted for a reasonable length 
of time (approximately 1 year or longer).
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No Transitional Object Group: This group consisted of those 
persons indicating no clear cut attachments of the sort 
described above.
From the 107 subjects selected based upon these criteria, 64 
were willing to participate in the study. To further ensure the accu­
racy of the retrospective self-reports of these subjects, questionnaires 
(appendix B) were sent to the parents of these 64 subjects. These 
reports were compared with the self-reports as a means of validating 
the criteria proposed above. If any significant discrepancies existed 
the subject was eliminated. As a result 27 subjects were disgarded.
Five subjects (3 with transitional objects, 2 without transitional 
object as based upon self-reports) were eliminated as parental reports 
were not returned. Another 22 (11 with transitional objects, 11 with­
out transitional objects based upon self reports) were eliminated due 
to incongruities between reports by the subjects and reports by the par­
ents. Such discrepancies existed in the Transitional Object Group when 
either the subject reported a special object and their parents did not, 
or if the subject and parent reported different objects of importance.
In the No Transitional Object Group discrepancies involved parental 
reports of special object attachments when the subject did not report 
any.
In the final analysis 37 subjects remained. Nineteen had tran­
sitional objects based upon the specified criteria and consistency 
between self and parental reports. Eighteen indicated no evidence of 





Internal-External Scale (I-E). The Internal-External Scale is 
a 29 question scale, used to assess internal versus external locus of 
control. Six of the items are fillers to help disguise the purpose of 
the test. It consists of forced choice response items focusing upon 
one's beliefs about the world. Test-retest reliability measures have 
been demonstrated to be as high as .72 with combined male-female group 
administrations 1 month apart. Internal consistency measures have also 
been shown to be moderately stable with estimates as high as .73 with 
combined male-female group administrations (Rotter 1966).
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT). The Group Embedded Figures 
Test is an adaptation of the Embedded Figures Test used to assess the 
dimensions of field dependence-independence and globality-articulation 
in cognitive style. It consists of 7 practice items and 18 scorable 
ones. The Group Embedded Figures Test is a speed test which takes 20 
minutes to administer. Reliability measures of parallel forms produce 
rates of .82 for males and females (Witkin et al. 1971).
This I Believe Test (TIB). The This I Believe Test consists 
of 10 referent items of social and personal involvement. The subjects 
are required to write their beliefs about these ego-involving items.
The test assesses psychological differentiation through a concreteness- 
abstractness dimension. Scoring is based upon this dimension of 
concreteness-abstractness as a means of delineating psychological 
differentiation on the 4 belief systems scales (Harvey et al. 1961).
The This I Believe Test was also used to assess the dimension 
of "transitional relatedness." The criteria established were based
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upon a modification of those used in an earlier investigation (Horton 
et al. 1974). The criteria included: a sense of belongingness; having 
emotional investments in others; a sense of connectedness and attach­
ment; "soothing illusion" in one's experiences with others (e.g. family, 
friends, religion, work); personal beliefs that are significantly impor­
tant; ability to personalize and internalize; a sense of oneness and 
wholeness; and a general experiencing of the "cultural field."
The absence of "transitional relatedness" was characterized by 
criteria of: impersonalization; not feeling closeness or attachment to 
others; indifference; no strong personal beliefs; distancing of feelings; 
and a general lack of experiencing in the "cultural field."
The This I Believe Test was scored blindly by two separate raters 
on both aspects of its use in this study. Reliability indices were com­
puted between the raters.
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF). The Sixteen 
Personality Factor Questionnaire is a personality inventory consisting 
of 187 items. The questionnaire is based upon extensive factor analy­
tic research upon thousands of questions to provide accurate and valid 
indices on a wide range of personality traits. For Form A concept 
validities for the individual factors ranged from .35 to .92. Test- 
retest reliability measures for the various factors on Form A for short 
intervals (2-7 days) ranged from .72 to .92. With periods extending 
from 2-48 months test-retest reliabilities ranged from .35 to .85 
(Manual for the 16PF 1972).
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Procedure
The actual testing administration involved the 64 subjects 
screened from the self-reports alone. These subjects were tested in 
approximately equal groups but on three separate evenings. Subjects 
with transitional objects and those without transitional objects were 
equally distributed among the groups. The sessions were generally 
2-2^ hours in duration. The sequence of test presentation was the 
same at each administration. The order consisted of the Internal- 
External Scale, The Group Embedded Figures Test, The This I Believe 
Test, and The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire.
Each test came with prescribed instructions which were closely 
adhered to. They were also read aloud in each case by the test admin­
istrator to further ensure that the directions were fully understood.
Though data was collected on 64 subjects, only the data on 
the 37 subjects (19 with transitional objects, 18 without transi­
tional objects) as validated by the self- and parental-reports were 
used in the final analysis.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Treatment of the Data
Four test instruments were used in the present study to assess 
aspects of a dichotomously defined dimension of Transitional Object 
Attachment— No Traditional Object Attachment. These four measures 
(Internal-External Scale, Group Embedded Figures Test, This I Believe 
Test, Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire) were used as predictor 
variables of the dependent variable of Transitional Object— No Transi­
tional Object Attachment. Additional independent variables were age, 
sex and birth order. The data was analyzed using Multiple Regression 
Analysis.
The Relationship of Personality Variables to 
Transitional Object Attachment
In order to assess the effects of various personality factors 
on transitional object attachment the Sixteen Personality Factor Ques­
tionnaire was employed. The 16PF produced two sets of personality 
measures. The first consisted of 16 primary factors while the second 
set produced 4 second order variables. Separate regression equations 
were constructed for these two sets of predictor variables (see 
tables 1 and 2).
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT 
FROM SIXTEEN PERSONALITY FACTORS
TABLE 1
Source df SS MS F £
Reserved (sizothymia) vs. 
Outgoing (affectothymia)
1 1.0749 1.0749 5.95 .0241
Less Intelligent (lower 
scholastic mental capacity) 
vs. More Intelligent (higher 
scholastic mental capacity)
1 .1438 .0438 .80 n. s.
Affected by Feelings (lower 
ego strength) vs. Emotion­
ally Stable (higher ego 
strength)
1 .0000 .0000 .00 n. s.
Humble (submissiveness) vs. 
Assertive (dominance)
1 .0156 .0156 .09 n.s.
Sober (desurgency) vs. 
Happy-go-lucky (surgency)
1 .0785 .0785 .43 n.s.
Expedient (weaker superego 
strength) vs. Conscientious 
(stronger superego strength)
1 .0047 .0047 .03 n.s.
Shy (threctia) vs. Venture­
some (parmia)
1 .1005 .1005 .56 n.s.
Tough-minded (harria) vs. 
Tender-minded (premsia)
1 .0148 .0148 .08 n.s.
Trusting (alaxia) vs. 
Suspicious (protension)
1 .0349 .0349 .19 n.s.
Practical (praxernia) vs. 
Imaginative (autia)
1 .0046 .0046 .03 n.s.
Forthright (artlessness) 
vs. Shrewd (shrewdness)
1 .0137 .0137 .08 n.s.
Placid (untroubled adequacy) 
vs. Apprehension (guilt




Source df SS MS F £
Conservative (conservatism 
vs. Experiment ing 
(radicalism)
1 .0871 .0871 .48 n.s.
Group-dependent (group 
adherence) vs. Self- 
sufficient (self- 
sufficiency)
1 .2463 .2463 1.36 n. s.
Undisciplined Self-Conflict 
(low integration) vs. Con­
trolled (high self-concept 
control)
1 .0015 .0015 .01 n.s.
Relaxed (low ergic tension) 
vs. Tense (high ergic 
tension)
1 1.6090 1.6090 8.91 .0073
Error (Residual) 20 5.8106 .2905
Total SS - 9.24324 R2=.60942 p <.0791
TABLE 2
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING 
FROM FOUR SECOND ORDER
TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT 
PERSONALITY VARIABLES
Source df SS MS F £
Introversion vs. Extroversion 1 1.7460 1.7460 9.58 .0041
Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety 1 1.1748 1.1748 6.45 .0162
Tenderminded Emotionality vs. 
Tough Poise
1 .2624 .2624 1.44 n.s.
Subduedness vs. Independence 1 .1053 .1053 .53 n.s.
Error (Residual) 32 5.9547 .1861
Total SS - 9.24324 R2-.36935 p <.0043
57
The analysis of the sixteen variable equation produced a squared 
multiple R that accounts for 60.942% of the variance in the dependent 
variable. Significant effects were found in the Reserved (sizothymia) 
vs. Outgoing (affectothymia) dimension (F“ 5.95, p <.0241) and the 
Relaxed (low ergic tension) vs. Tense (high ergic tension) dimension 
(F= 8.91, p <.0073). These predictor variables considered alone in a 
separate regression equation produced a squared multiple R that accounted 
for 53.739% of the variance in the dependent variable. The effects of 
the remaining 14 variables did not significantly add to the predictive 
power of the equation (F(14,20)= .2635, n.s.).
Inspection of the means for the Transitional Object Group and No 
Transitional Object Group on the Reserved (sizothymia) vs. Outgoing 
(affectothymia) dimension revealed that it was the No Transitional 
Object Group that deviated from the norm on that factor. This devia­
tion was in the Reserved (sizothymia) direction. On the Relaxed (low 
ergic tension) vs. Tense (high ergic tension) dimension it was the 
Transitional Object Group that deviated from the norm. This occurred 
in the Tense (high ergic tension) direction (see table 3).
In the second regression equation involving the 4 second order 
predictor variables, a squared multiple R which accounted for 36.935% 
of the variance in the dependent variable was produced. Significant 
effects were found in the Introversion vs. Extroversion dimension 
(F= 9.58, p <.0041) and the Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety dimension 
(F= 6.45, p <.0162). These factors considered in a two variable 
regression equation produced a squared multiple R that explains 
33.942% of the variance in the dependent variable. The effects of
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the other two variables which had been considered in the 4 variable 
equation did not add to the predictive power of the equation (F(2,32)* 
.7593, n.s.).
TABLE 3
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL OBJECT GROUP 
AND NO TRANSITIONAL OBJECT GROUP ON TWO PERSONALITY FACTORS
Factor
Groups**
Population Parameters* T.O. N.T.O.
Reserved (sizothymia) vs. Mean 10.93 10.32 7.61
Outgoing (affectothymia) Std. Dev. 3.45 2.75 2.59
Relaxed (low ergic tension) Mean 13.43 17.21 12.50




Males and Females: Form A 
(based on 20 years; N=4272)
**Groups— T.0.= Transitional Object Group
N.T.O. = No Transitional Object Group
Inspection of the means for the Transitional Object Group and 
No Transitional Object Group on the Introversion vs. Extroversion dimen­
sion indicated that it was the No Transitional Object Group that deviated 
from the norm on this factor. The deviation was in the Introversion 
direction. On the Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety scale it was the Tran­
sitional Object Group that deviated from the norm. This occurred in 
the High Anxiety direction (see table 4).
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MEANS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL OBJECT GROUP AND NO TRANSITIONAL 





Introversion vs . Extroversion 5.5 5.85 4.60
Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety 5.5 6.62 5.34
*Groups— T.O. = Transitional Object Group
N.T.O. = No Transitional Object Group
The Relationship of Psychological Differentiation 
Variables to Transitional Object Attachment
Two measures used to focus upon the aspects of psychological 
differentiation as related to transitional object attachment were the 
Group Embedded Figures Test and This I Believe Test. A two variable 
regression equation was constructed to analyze the amount of variance 
in the dependent variable predicted by these independent variables 
(see table 5).
TABLE 5
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT FROM 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION VARIABLES
Source df SS MS F £
TIB 1 .0816 .0816 .30 n.s.
GEFT 1 .0114 .0114 .04 n.s.
Error (Residual) 34 9.1504 .2691
Total SS = 9.24324 r2= .00998 n.s.
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The analysis produced a squared multiple R explaining only .998% 
of the variance in the dependent variable. No significant effects were 
found.
The Relationship of Transitional Relatedness 
to Transitional Object Attachment
The dimension of transitional relatedness, as defined earlier, 
was used as a predictor variable of transitional object attachment.
It was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (low transitional related­
ness) to 5 (high transitional relatedness). Two independent raters 
were involved in the assessment of the dimension from the responses 
given by the subjects to the TIB. The raters scored the responses 
blind as the group membership of the subjects (i.e., Transitional 
Object Group or No Transitional Object Group). Since the rating was 
not a strict categorization but rather an impressionistic assessment 
on this scale, a correlation between raters was done (r= .46868) as 
an index of reliability.
The scores produced by both raters were placed in a two vari­
able regression equation (see table 6). The analysis produced a 
squared multiple R that explained only 5.642% of the variance in the 
dependent variable. No significant effects were found.
The Relationship of Locus of Control to 
Transitional Object Attachment
The dimension of Locus of Control as measured by the Internal- 
External Scale was another variable used in predicting transitional 
object attachment. No significant relationship was found between the 
locus of control variable and transitional object attachment (r= -.2089). 
The correlation was in the expected direction as hypothesized.
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT 
FROM MEASURES OF TRANSITIONAL RELATEDNESS
TABLE 6
Source df SS MS F 2
T.R. 1* 1 .4826 .4826 1.88 n.s.
T.R. 2** 1 .0229 .0229 .09 n.s.
Error (Residual) 34 8.7377 .2569
Total SS = 9.24324 R2= .05641 n.s.
*T.R. 1 = Transitional Relatedness (Rater 1)
**T.R. 2 = Transitional Relatedness (Rater 2)
The Relationship of Age, Sex and Birth Order 
Variables to Transitional Object Attachment
The effects of age, sex and birth order were analyzed to deter­
mine if they contributed any precision to the prediction of transitional 
object attachment. A 3 variable multiple regression equation was con­
structed (see table 7). The analysis produced a squared multiple R 
which explained only 3.781X of the variance in the dependent variable.
No significant effects were found.
Summary of the Results
The analysis of the data revealed significant relationships 
between the presence of a transitional object in early childhood and 
the personality variables in the Tense (high ergic tension) directional 
dimension and High Anxiety directional dimension of the Sixteen Person­
ality Factor Questionnaire. The absence of a transitional object
62
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT
TABLE 7
FROM AGE, SEX AND BIRTH ORDER
Source df SS MS F £
Age 1 .0002 .0002 .00 n. s.
Sex 1 .0438 .0438 .16 n. s.
Birth Order 1 .2906 .2906 1.08 n. s.
Error (Residual) 33 8.9086 .2699
Total SS = 9.24324 R2= .0378 n. s.
attachment in early childhood was related to the personality variables 
in the Reserved (sizothymia) directional dimension and Introversion 
directional dimension, also of the Sixteen Personality Factor Ques­
tionnaire.
There were no significant relationships found between the 
Transitional Object Group and the No Transitional Object Group on 
the psychological differentiation variables (GEFT, TIB), the vari­
able of transitional relatedness (TIB), the locus of control vari­
able (I-E Scale), and age, sex, and birth order variables.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The major findings of the present study demonstrated specific 
personality characteristics which were related to the absence or 
presence of a transitional object in early childhood.
The features of the personality factors related to the absence 
of a specific object attachment were in the Reserved (sizothymia) and 
Introverted directions of their respective dimensions on the 16PF.
The Reserved (sizothymia) factor reflects tendencies of aloofness, 
detachment, and skepticism. These characteristics correspond in a 
descriptive manner to the psychiatric classification of schizoid 
functioning. The Introversion factor is indicative of shyness, self- 
sufficiency, with general avoidance of interpersonal contact. These 
traits often reflect social inhibitions (Manual for the 16PF 1972; 
Cattell and Eber 1957).
The personality factors related to the presence of transitional 
object attachments were in the Tense (high ergic tension) and High 
Anxiety directions of their respective dimensions on the 16PF. The 
Tense (high ergic tension) factor indicates excitability, restlessness, 
and impatience. Such persons are frustrated, driven, and overwrought. 
Clinically this categorization has been corresponded to neurotic type 
tendencies. It has been interpreted as reflecting "undischarged and 
partly uncontrollable libido" (Cattell and Eber 1957, p. 19). It
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seems to be energy in excess of the ego's ability to discharge it. The 
High Anxiety scale reflects common notions of anxiety often with accom­
panying maladjustment. Often this factor characterizes a tendency of 
dissatisfaction with the ability to meet life's demands (Manual for the 
16PF 1972; Cattell and Eber 1957).
No significant relationships were found between the presence or 
absence of a transitional object attachment and the psychological dif­
ferentiation scales (GEFT, TIB) and locus of control scale (IE). There 
were no significant relationships found between transitional related­
ness and transitional object attachment. Neither were there relation­
ships found between age, sex, and birth order and the dependent variable, 
though none were expected.
Although there were several hypotheses formed regarding these 
variables and transitional object attachment, none were supported. But 
rather than concluding no relationships exist between transitional 
object attachment and the concepts of psychological differentiation, 
locus of control and transitional relatedness, it might be more accu­
rate to assume no relationships exist between transitional object 
attachment and the scales used to measure these dimensions.
The problem that exists has always been one that has hindered 
attempts at empirical investigations of psychoanalytic theories. Spe­
cifically, this involves the problems that arise in methodologically 
implementing devices to measure the often intangible concepts of psy­
choanalysis (see Kline 1972 for a review of empirical research of 
Freudian theory). However, the transitional object by its very nature 
as a concrete observable entity, provides a unique opportunity to
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attempt assessment of psychoanalytic theory. The problem does remain 
in trying to objectively quantify a dynamically conceived developmental 
phenomenon. Though it exists for superficial scrutiny, as previous 
descriptive studies of it have shown, its conceptualization in dynamic 
terms presents difficult problems in finding empirical measures of the 
psychological function it serves.
Two scales used in this study, for example, the GEFT and the 
TIB, both measures of psychological differentiation, are cognitive in 
their emphasis. Such a focus limits the impact that libidinal factors 
may contribute to the separation-individuation process and hence influ­
ence the measurement of psychological differentiation.
Certain technical factors need to be considered in addition to 
the problems existing due to the possible inadequacy of the scales to 
assess the theoretical postulates underlying the development of the 
transitional object. The first involves the rather small size of the 
groups used in the study. This makes small differences that may exist 
difficult to find. Another problem is the subjective nature of the 
TIB in both its usages, as an index of differentiation as well as in 
measuring transitional relatedness. This made scoring difficult and 
reliability difficult to satisfactorily obtain. The IE scale was 
also problematic due to the apparent obviousness of socially desir­
able responses.
In spite of the difficulties existing in empirically assessing 
behavior in terms of psychoanalytic concepts, the 16PF produced distin­
guishing differential characteristics between the Transitional Object 
Group and the No Transitional Object Group. Although it is not possible
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to accurately assess genetic-dynamic aspects of these differences from 
information gained only from a personality inventory, it is apparent 
that differences exist. Speculation as to what these empirical differ­
ences suggest in terms of the psychological processes involved is criti­
cal to furthering the understanding and conceptualization of the role 
and function of the transitional object or the absence of it in the 
developmental process.
From the analysis of the data it appears that both the No Tran­
sitional Object Group and the Transitional Object Group are demonstrat­
ing some characteristics of pathological functioning. Some mention 
needs to be made first of the nature of the object attachments or lack 
of them that these groups demonstrated. Those in the No Transitional 
Object Group very conspicuously lacked any special inanimate object 
attachment while the Transitional Object Group demonstrated very strong 
and persistent attachments to a singular inanimate object (these may 
closely resemble the true transitional objects that Winnicott mentions 
as being, at times, more important than the mother). Selection of these 
relatively extreme groups in terms of object attachment appeared neces­
sary to maximize the differences between the two groups. It may also be 
that it created an artificial dichotomy of object usage. The range of 
object attachments may be more appropriately viewed on a continuum with 
the extreme absence or presence of object usage not representing an 
optimal state of affairs.
However, it should be noted that the pathological features of 
these groups do not suggest the extreme forms of pathology that have 
been found in objectless maternally deprived infants (Provence and
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Ritvo 1961) or the fetishistic manifestations of object usage by 
extremely overfrustrated and overstimulated children (Sperling 1963; 
Dickes 1963; Greenacre 1969). The differences that exist here are 
probably within more moderate limits.
These may be the kind of differences that exist within what 
might be considered a range of normal variation. Such differences 
in terms of inanimate object attachment may be seen in the cross- 
cultural studies (Gaddini 1970; Hong and Townes 1976). These studies 
found that infants experiencing a great deal of maternal contact and 
apparently limited separation experiences rarely developed transi­
tional object attachments. Those with greater and more frequent 
separation experiences and less contact with the mother especially 
during bedtime were more likely to develop transitional object attach­
ments. Neither of these developmental patterns are seen as pathologi­
cal yet the role of object attachments in both are obviously different.
What is apparent from the present study is that the experiences 
leading to the development or absence of an inanimate object attachment 
in early childhood are significant in terms of one's later psychologi­
cal functioning.
These variations in transitional object development or absence 
of its development may be closely tied to moderate vicissitudes in the 
separation-individuation process described by Mahler (1975). These are 
vicissitudes involving both the infant's readiness for independent 
functioning as well as the mother's role in allowing it to optimally 
proceed, by neither being over-intrusive nor too distant and withdrawn.
The critical factors surrounding the more subtle early mother- 
infant experiences are the ones in need of further scrutiny particularly
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as they influence the development of transitional object attachments.
Experiences of frustration may be tied to this process, spe­
cifically Kohut's (1971) concept of "optimal frustration" as it facil­
itates the internalization of psychic structure via "transmuting 
internalizations."
Though the transitional object has been suggested as providing 
an intermediary form of structure during the separation-individuation 
process (Tolpin 1971), the psychological functioning of the Transitional 
Object Group in the present study appears to call into question the 
soothing structure enhancing functions of very strong inanimate object 
attachments. Apparently these individuals in later life are lacking to 
some degree the internal resources to deal comfortably and securely 
with the world. It may be possible that such rigid object attachments 
do not indicate ongoing structure enhancing processes but rather uninte­
grated external adaptations to the unresponsiveness and frustrations of 
aspects of the environment. In these cases it may be possible that the 
soothing functions of the object do not "go-inside" as fully adequate 
structure. Surely the functions of a special object attachment are 
only as good as the soothing functions experienced for the primary 
object of importance (i.e., mother).
Winnicott (1953) has suggested that the transitional object 
helps mediate the growing adaptations by the infant to the external 
world and outer reality. The strong and persistent attachment that 
he believed were most healthy and characteristic of the true transi­
tional object (i.e., more important, at times, than the mother), may 
not necessarily be the most optimal.
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Winnicott realized the necessity of the gradual lessening of 
the mother's adaptations to the infant as the maturation process pro­
ceeds allowing the infant to make greater adaptations to failure and 
frustration by the mother and environment. It may be that as these 
experiences of failure and frustration exceed the infant's capacity 
to deal with them, the greater the attachment to an object may become, 
and the longer they may persist. Thus, though the adaptations are 
within the normal range they are not optimal and hence not fully able 
to help the individual deal with and tolerate frustration.
The absence of special object attachments, on the other hand, 
may indicate a different kind of adaptation. The characteristics of 
the No Transitional Object Group demonstrate a detriment in the indi­
vidual's ability to engage the world. Unlike the Transitional Object 
Group where an overt external adaptation is made, the No Transitional 
Object Group may be demonstrating an internal adaptation to experi­
ences with the environment. The experiences that may be encountered 
by these individuals are a world that is threatening due to its tend­
ency to be impinging particularly in preventing the development of 
independent functioning. This would create the experience of a world 
that is threatening and frustrating, and needs to be escaped from by 
internal strategy mechanisms. Thus, the internalization process of 
incorporating soothing psychic structures would be interfered with 
like the Transitional Object Group but with a different genetic com­
ponent and different dynamic manifestation.
In light of the empirical results of the present study, the 
major theoretical position supported in terms of the optimal usage
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of inanimate objects in early development is that proposed by Dickes
(1978). Dickes has reserved the larger area of moderate usage of an
object as most indicative of the healthy use of objects. His view can
best be expressed in the following:
Evidence points to the existence of a spectrum composed at 
one end of children who make no special use of inanimate 
objects other than for their enjoyment and at the other end 
of those who use inanimate objects in a grossly pathological 
manner. Between these extremes is the great middle group, 
children who use a toy or an object to relieve anxiety and 
discharge tension, but never rely on objects to such an 
extent that the normal development fails. I have suggested 
that the term transitional object be reserved for these 
children, who never value their possessions more than their 
mothers (p. 318).
From the present investigation it is clear that a need exists 
for further empirical research in this fascinating "third area" of 
experience. For only by such efforts may conflicting theoretical 
notions be resolved thus expanding the knowledge of transitional 




This is a questionnaire designed to explore important features of early 
childhood. Specifically, it will focus upon significant attachments 
one may form to certain toys or objects. Many children form these 
attachments while many others do not, yet both are considered normal 
and healthy modes of development. This questionnaire requires you to 
try to recall, as accurately as possible, these kind of experiences 
from your early childhood. If you do not actually remember these 
experiences, yet they were related to you in later years by your par­
ents or older siblings, please describe them anyway as they were 
described to you. Your cooperation in describing such experiences 
will help to provide further understanding of the mental functioning 
of children. It should be noted that all information will remain
completely confidential.
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Name_____________________________ Date of Birth:___________________




Parents Marital Status: ___Married ___Separated ___Divorced
___Deceased (please indicate dates of separa­
tion, divorce, or death if applicable)
Do you have any brothers or sisters? Please list them in birth order 
indicating their sex and age.
As a child did you share a room with a sibling(s) or did you have your 
own room? (if shared, how many in the room)
As a child did you ever suck your thumb or fingers, use a pacifier, bite 
your nails or any similar activity? (please describe)
When you were a small child (approximately preschool age, 1-6 years) did 
you have any special toy(s) or object(s) that was important to you? (eg. 
blanket, teddy bear, stuffed animal, etc.) If so, please describe it.
If there was more than one mentioned, was there one that was most impor­
tant or more important than the others.
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If you did have such a toy or object, please answer the following:
-Did your toy or object have a special name: If so, what was it?
-Do you remember specifically receiving the toy or object, or does 
it seem as though you havealways remembered having it?
-In what situations, places, or times did you most often have it 
with you. (eg. bedtime, when lonely or afraid, when playing, etc.)
-Were there any special qualities about the toy or object that stand 
out in your mind? (eg. texture, color, smell, etc.)
-Was there anything else important about your toy or object that 
has not been mentioned?
Did you ever have any sort of routine or ritual before going to sleep 
as a child? (eg. special song, story or activity, etc.)






Your child_________________, has volunteered to participate in a study
designed to explore some important features of early childhood. Spe­
cifically, it will focus upon significant attachments a child may form 
to certain toys or objects. Many children form these attachments while 
many others do not, yet both are considered normal and healthy modes of 
development. Your cooperation in describing such experiences, if 
applicable to your child, is a necessary part of this study. Your 
responses will help provide further understanding of the mental func­
tioning of children. I hope that you will take a few minutes, as soon 
as possible, to complete the following questions and return the ques­
tionnaire in the enclosed stamp addressed envelope. Your child will 
receive extra credit needed to his or her psychology course average 








Relationship to Child: _____Mother _____Father _____Guardian
Did your son or daughter as a small child (approximately 6 mo. - 6 yrs.) 
have any special toy(s) or object(s) that was important to them? (eg. 
blanket, teddy bear, stuffed animal, etc.) If so, please describe.
If there were several such toys or objects, was there one that was most 
important or more important than the others?
If your son or daughter did have such a toy or object, please answer the 
following:
-At approximately what age did you notice its onset of use?
-Did the toy or object have a special name? If so, what was it?
-Was the toy or object given to the child by yourself or someone 
else as a present or was it something the child found for him­
self or herself?
-In what situations, places or times did your child most often want 
or require the toy or object? (eg. bedtime, when left alone, when 
playing, etc.)
-Until approximately what age did your child have his or her toy or 
object? Do you remember any specific incident in which it was
given up?
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-Did you primarily approve or disapprove of its use?
-Were there any special qualities about the toy or object that 
stand out in your mind as being important to your child? (eg. 
texture, color, smell, etc.)
-Was there anything else important about your child's toy or 
object that has not been mentioned?
As an infant did your son or daughter have his or her crib in your bed­
room or did he or she have a separate room?
If your child shared your room, until what age did he or she do so?
After leaving your room did he or she share a room with an older child 
or relative or have a separate room?
Did your son or daughter ever suck his or her thumb or fingers, use a 
pacifier, bite his or her nails, or any other similar activity?
Did your son or daughter have any sort of routine or ritual before going 
to sleep as a child? (eg. special song, story, or activity, etc.)
Did your son or daughter have an imaginary playmate as a child? If so,
please describe.
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